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ON THE HUMAN BODY AS 
PROPERTY: THE MEANING OF 
EMBODIMENT, MARKETS, AND 
THE MEANING OF STRANGERS 
Thomas H. Murray* 
Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his pres-
ence certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked what he 
should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they 
died. To which they answered, that there was no sum that 
would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain 
Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fa-
thers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by ... what he 
should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their 
decease. The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him forbear 
such language. 1 
Herodotus took this as proof of Pindar's judgment that "[l]aw 
[or custom, or mores] is the king o'er all."2 But we will take it as 
proof that for all their differences about what constituted re-
spectful treatment of the dead bodies of their fathers, the 
Greeks and the Callatians were equally horrified at the prospect 
of treating them disrespectfully. Darius ruled, however, over the 
Persians as well. They were so disdainful of the body that they 
would not bury one of their dead until the corpse had been torn 
by a dog or a bird of prey. In our dealings with the body, we 
must decide whether we have more in common with the Greeks 
and Callatians, or with Darius's Persians. 
For as long as I can recall, newspapers have published brief 
items in which someone has calculated what the human body is 
"worth" on the open market. The value of the body-as reduced 
to its chemical components-was never more than a few dollars. 
A more accurate accounting, though, would include the market 
value of transplantable organs and tissues, as well as the poten-
tial bonanza to be had should a cell line cultured from that body 
• Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine and Director, 
Center for Biomedical Ethics. B.A., 1968, Temple University; Ph.D., 1976, Princeton 
University. 
1. HERODOTUS, HISTORY OF THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WAR 137 (W. Forrest ed. 1963); 
see also L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 281 (1985). 
2. HERODOTUS, supra note 1, at 138. 
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prove valuable to the biotechnology industry. The bottom line 
could be anywhere from tens of thousands to perhaps millions of 
dollars. 
Unfortunately, this more "realistic" accounting of the body's 
worth destroys the humor latent in those earlier efforts. What 
made us chuckle at those stories was the obvious ludicrousness 
of imposing one concept of "value" (monetary price as deter-
mined by markets) upon an object (the human body) for which 
it is wholly inappropriate. We knew that the worth of our bodies 
was not remotely gauged by such calculations. We may not have 
been certain why. Now that body parts may become a lucrative 
economic asset (for many of us, our single most valuable asset), 
we can no longer afford to leave unexamined the source of our 
body's worth. Scholars are proposing that we ought to be al-
lowed to sell off pieces of our bodies,3 and entrepreneurs are 
looking for legal openings permitting them to create markets in 
human body parts! Before subscribing to such schemes, we need 
to examine what is at stake. 
Both moral and legal questions arise. Would it be a good prac-
tice for people to be buying and selling their body parts? What 
attitude should the law take towards potential markets in 
human body parts? This Article will focus on the moral ques-
tion, although both common and statutory law governing the 
treatment of the body are in part manifestations of prevailing 
moral views about the body, and will be discussed as such. 
Proponents of markets in human body parts argue, like Da-
rius, that the moral outrage towards what we regard as misuse of 
the human body is mere superstition and sentimentality.11 Look-
ing closely at the arguments, they find no good reason to inter-
fere with the liberty of individuals to buy and sell body parts.6 
The promarket supporters are correct in asserting that society 
should not infringe on liberty without good reason, but they err 
in dismissing the broad and strong moral sentiment against such 
markets as having no reasonable grounds. There are at least 
three broad reasons for opposing markets in human body parts. 
The first rests on the moral significance of the human body-the 
meaning of embodiment.7 The second comes from an analysis of 
3. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 28-38. 
4. See, e.g., Annas, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Organ Sales, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP .. Feb. 1984, at 22-23. 
5. See Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 
1985, at 31-37. 
6. See H. ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 127-35 (1986). 
7. See infra notes 20-83 and accompanying text. 
SUMMER 1987] Human Body as Property 1057 
the pros and cons of plausible markets in body parts, and the 
effects of such markets on the common good and on justice.8 
The third reason focuses upon the uses of certain human body 
parts to assuage human needs, and the role of gifts, including 
impersonal gifts, in promoting solidarity within a large, bureau-
cratic society.9 
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF THE HUMAN BODY 
Social controversies never appear in a vacuum. To set the 
stage for a discussion of these theoretical issues, we must de-
scribe the practical context in which questions about the com-
mercializability of the body have arisen. 
Although debates over the appropriateness of markets in 
human materials, particularly blood, date back almost two de-
cades, two relatively recent phenomena have sharpened the con-
troversy: the prospect of markets in human organs, and the dis-
covery that human biomaterials may have considerable market 
value to the biotechnology industry. 
A. Markets in Human Organs 
The increasing success rate for organ transplantation, coupled 
with the inadequacy of prevailing methods for obtaining trans-
plantable organs, resulted in a shortage of organs and prompted 
the emergence of a market in human organs. Advertisements ap-
peared in American publications offering organs for sale, and 
one Virginia entrepreneur went so far as to obtain a license for 
the import and export of human organs. 1° Kidneys are of special 
interest because they are transplanted with the most success of 
all major organs, and because humans are born with two but 
need only one healthy one to live. 11 
8. See infra notes 84-109 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text. 
10. Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. 1. 
11. One would-be vendor offered to sell his liver, until it was pointed out to him that, 
alas, he had no.spare. This story was related to the author by Arthur L. Caplan, Director 
of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Caplan received 
a phone call from this individual. 
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In 1968, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved 
a model Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which, as the title im-
plies, addresses gifts of the body or its parts for transplantation, 
medical research, and education.12 The Act, adopted mostly in-
tact by all states and the District of Columbia, is mute on the 
subject of commerce in the body. Filling this gap, Congress en-
acted the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984.13 The Act 
prohibits the purchase for transplantation of human livers, kid-
neys, hearts, lungs, pancreases, bone marrow, corneas, eyes, 
bone, or skin. A number of states have passed laws with similar 
provisions banning the commercialization of transplantable 
human organs and tissues in intrastate commerce as well. 14 Al-
though the new laws may have settled for now the legality of 
such sales, the debate over the ethics of markets in transplant-
able organs remains lively. 
B. The Biotechnology Lottery and the Mo Cell Line 
One of the strangest fruits of biotechnology is the case of the 
Mo Cell Line. Biologists, in recent years, have improved greatly 
their ability to create and sustain so-called "immortal" cell lines 
derived from human cells. These cell cultures earn the honorific 
"immortal" because, unlike normal human cells that divide a fi-
nite number of times and then perish, these cells continue to 
grow and divide indefinitely. 
Occasionally, an immortal human cell line is developed that 
has commercial value to the emerging biotechnology industry. 
Such may have been the case in the Mo Cell Line, developed 
from the cells of John Moore who suffered from a rare cancer of 
the blood known as hairy cell leukemia. H As a side effect of the 
disease, Moore's spleen became dangerously enlarged. To fore-
close the possibility that his spleen would rupture and kill him, 
Moore's physician at the time, Dr. David Golde, recommended 
that Moore have his spleen removed; that was done. Dr. Golde 
12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, SA U.L.A. 15 (1985). 
13. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e 
(Supp. III 1985)). 
14. E.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 367f (West Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-408 (1982 & Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West Supp. 1987); 
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW§ 4307 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-289.1 (1985). 
15. See The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of Biomedical 
Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight. of the House 
Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 240-78 (1985) (statement of 
John Moore, leukemia patient/research subject). 
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arranged for material from Moore's spleen to be sent to his labo-
ratory for research purposes. At this point Dr. Golde's and Mr. 
Moore's accounts diverge. 
According to Mr. Moore, he made approximately a dozen trips 
from Seattle to Los Angeles to see Dr. Golde during which sam-
ples of his blood were taken. All these visits were at Mr. Moore's 
expense until April 1983 when, after Mr. Moore suggested the 
samples be taken locally, Dr. Golde offered to pay his expenses. 
At this visit, Mr. Moore was presented with a new consent form 
that read in part "I (do, do not) voluntarily grant to the Univer-
sity of California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in 
any cell line or any other potential product which might be de-
veloped from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from 
me."16 Moore signed this form, circling "do." On his next (and 
last) visit, Moore claims he was again given the same form to 
sign; this time he circled "do not." This apparently led to some 
consternation in Dr. Golde's lab, and despite calls and letters 
requesting him to sign the form with "do" circled, Moore opted 
instead to go in search of a lawyer. 
The source of the consternation was the rights to an immortal 
cell line that scientists in Dr. Golde's lab had cultured from Mr. 
Moore's cells. Moreover, this cell line-dubbed the "Mo Cell 
Line"-produced significant quantities of a group of biologically 
important proteins called lymphokines that act as messengers to 
tell cells to mature, divide, or do any of a number of things. 17 
Normal human cells produce such small quantities of 
lymphokines that they cannot be isolated in useful amounts. 
Possibly because of a defect in their genetic control mechanisms, 
the T-lymphocytes (a kind of white blood cell crucial in fighting 
infection, the same kind destroyed by the AIDS virus) from 
Moore's body produced prodigious quantities of a number of 
lymphokines. 
Moore's diseased cells, thanks to the ingenuity of Dr. Golde's 
research team, had the potential to be a scientific bonanza. But 
external events soon took the Mo Cell Line, its scientific mid-
wives, -and its progenitor beyond the laboratory. By the late 
1970's, biotechnology had begun to attract attention and money. 
Researchers began to realize that biological research could have 
great commercial value. In this heady atmosphere, Dr. Golde re-
16. Id. at 268. 
17. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 31-46 (1987) [hereinafter 
OTA]. 
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ported to UCLA's patent office that he had a potentially valua-
ble, patentable cell line.18 On March 20, 1984, the United States 
Patent Office granted patent number 4,438,032 for a "Unique T-
Lymphocyte Line and Products Derived Therefrom."19 
By April 1984, Mr. Moore had found his lawyer, and the legal 
battle began over the ownership of the cell line and the patents 
derived from it. Is the cell line rightfully the property of Dr. 
Golde and his institution, because it was his recognition of its 
significance and the admixture of his skill and art that led to the 
patent? Or, because it was a part of Mr. Moore's body, indeed a 
living part, and because it may have been put to uses not con-
templated by him when he consented to its use in research, does 
he still retain some interest in it? Is Mr. Moore entitled to a 
share in profits derived from the Mo Cell line? Although all 
these questions are significant, the chief issue I will discuss is 
whether and in what forms the human body, its parts, or its 
products is a fit object for commercial trade. 
II. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EMBODIMENT 
Human individuals exist, so far as we know, only as embodied 
beings. What to make of this cold fact, though, has posed an 
intellectual challenge at least as old as our earliest written tradi-
tions. For some, the body is morally insignificant or worse-an 
impediment to the attainment of higher goods. For others, our 
bodies are as much a part of our core moral selves as our minds 
(or souls). In this section, I will examine several answers to the 
question: What is the moral significance of the body? I will look 
at the answers given in Anglo-American common law, and by 
classical and contemporary, secular and religious thinkers. 
A. Anglo-American Law and the Body: An Informal Moral 
Archaeology 
As a social creation, the law, at least in part, reflects the moral 
convictions of its creators. When courts occasionally refer to of-
fenses against public sensibilities, it is difficult to imagine what 
else such references might mean if not that some action or prac-
18. Letter from David W. Golde, M.D. to Roger G. Ditzel (Aug. 17, 1979) (accompa-
nying Report on Possibly Patentable Device, Process, Product, or Plant). 
19. U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984) to Golde. 
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tice contravenes deeply held beliefs about what is good or ac-
ceptable. 20 Any effort to interpret common law or statute as hav-
ing normative, rather than merely descriptive, moral 
connotations must proceed cautiously, however. For example, if 
friendship between blacks and whites in the antebellum South 
offended the sensibilities of genteel whites, that is hardly a con-
vincing moral reason to condemn interracial friendships. But we 
can learn something about our moral beliefs by looking at the 
law's response to moral dilemmas. If the pattern revealed in our 
laws is consistent with good reasons to hold specific moral be-
liefs, we can see ethics and law as mutually supportive. I believe 
this is true of our ethics and law regarding the treatment of the 
body. 
Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery21 provides an 
opportunity to test my theory. The case involved a dispute be-
tween a wife and daughter over burial. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court noted "[t]hat there is no right or property in a 
dead body, using the word in its ordinary sense .... Yet the 
burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of 
mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of actual 
property."22 The court then determined the body to be quasi 
property 
to which certain persons may have rights, as they have 
duties to perform towards it arising out of our common 
humanity. But the person having charge of it cannot be 
considered as the owner . . . he holds it only as a sacred 
trust for the benefit of all who may from family or friend-
ship have an interest in it.23 
There must be some analytic scheme under which people may 
find redress, or be punished, when the body or its parts are sto-
len, disinterred, or otherwise mistreated. The concept of prop-
erty-or better, "quasi property"-indeed may be the most con-
venient one, but only insofar as it refers to a strictly limited 
subset of the "rights, duties, power, liabilities and so on"24 that 
apply to full-fledged property. Neither decedents nor their fami-
20. See Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1242-45 & 
nn.400, 403 & 416 (1974) (discussing The Queen v. Scott, 114 Eng. Rep. 97 (Q.B. 1842); 
The King v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1788); Dust to Dust, 9 SoL. J. 3 (1864)). 
21. 10 R.I. 227 (1872). 
22. Id. at 237-38. 
23. Id. at 242-43. 
24. Matthews, Whose Body? People As Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PRoBs. 193, 194 
(1983). 
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lies have any right to benefit commercially from the sale of bod-
ies. Yet, they have a clear right to seek compensation for emo-
tional distress resulting from mistreatment of a body. Together, 
these observations suggest that it is the symbolic human mean-
ing of the body, rather than any commercial interest, that leads 
us even to use the fiction of "property" in order to assure that 
legal remedies are available for offenses against the body, an ob-
ject of rich moral significance. 211 The recent laws banning organ 
sales also attest to strong and widely-held moral convictions 
about the importance of the body.26 
The relationship of the material body to whatever it is that is 
morally important about us-whether soul, capacity for reason, 
personhood, or something else-has long been a subject of con-
cern and speculation. Although some writers and traditions have 
viewed the body as inseparable from that which possesses moral 
significance, other thinkers and traditions take an attitude of in-
difference or even antagonism towards the body. To those dis-
senting views we now turn. 
B. The Body As Impediment or As Object Without 
Significance 
The human body, with its appetites and propensities for mal-
functioning, has always been problematic for those who quested 
after purity, whether of reason or conduct. 
For Plato, as for others who preceded him, the body was a 
tomb in which the soul was forced to dwell temporarily. In the 
Phaedo, Plato argued that the soul's aim is to rid itself of the 
body, which stands in the way of true knowledge of the ideal 
"Forms."27 The body, for him, was an impediment. 
25. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser 
writes: 
In most of these cases [dealing with dead bodies] the courts have talked of a 
somewhat dubious "property right" to the body, usually in the next of kin, 
which did not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be 
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but 
is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that 
such "property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and 
that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a 
fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
26. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
27. PLATO, PHAEDO (R. Hackforth trans. 1955); see also Long, Psychological Ideas in 
Antiquity, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 3 (P. Wiener ed. 1973). 
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Religious questers as well often have held harsh attitudes to-
wards the body. For Gnostics-searchers after gnosis or true 
knowledge-the body was a barrier to their quest, to be sur-
mounted either by self-denial or by licentious attentiveness to 
bodily desires. 28 Both extremes share the same fundamental at-
titudes that the corporeal body is not to be trusted and has no 
moral worth. In the third century A.D., the Manicheans prac-
ticed severe forms of asceticism in order to free the "particles of 
light" that Satan had stolen and imprisoned in man's brain.29 
The Cathari, or Albigensians, who lived between the eleventh 
and thirteenth centuries, believed that all matter was evil, for-
bade marriage, and prescribed for the holiest among themselves 
endura, suicide by starvation. so 
In Rene Descartes' philosophy, the split between body and 
soul widened. Although Descartes was motivated by a desire to 
prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, his 
efforts to show that material things and things of the spirit are 
fundamentally distinct were more successful than his attempts 
to wring theological proofs out of that split. Refusing to believe 
anything of which he could be less than absolutely certain, he 
rejected as illusionary all but one proposition: that there had to 
be an "I" who did the skeptical thinking. Thus came his famous 
first principle, "I think, therefore I am." From this beginning, it 
was but a short distance to the most fundamental split between 
that which thinks, res cogitans, and the material world, res 
extensa. 31 
The propensity to dismiss the body as morally insignificant or, 
worse, as a positive barrier to fulfilling humankind's purpose, 
has a long history in religious and philosophical traditions. What 
attitude we should take towards the body is a question with 
which every culture must grapple. There are available only vari-
ants of a few possible choices, one of the most common being to 
reject the body's moral significance either through promiscuous 
28. Petrement, Dualism in Philosophy and Religion, in 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS, supra note 27, at 42. 
29. THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 848-49 (F. Cross ed. 1957). 
30. Id. at 30. 
31. 
I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists entirely 
in thinking, and which, for its existence, has no need of place, and is not depen-
dent on any material thing; so that this I, that is to say, the soul, by which I am 
what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and is indeed more easy to know 
than the body, and would not itself cease to be all that it is, even should the 
body cease to exist. 
R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, pt. 4, in DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 141 
(N. Smith trans. 1952). 
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gratification or self-mortification. It is not surprising, then, that 
echoes of earlier choices may be heard in contemporary ideas 
about the body. 
Because much of the intellectual energy in the current debate 
over the body as property has come from scholars in the loosely-
defined field of bioethics (which includes law, religion, and phi-
losophy among other disciplines), it is appropriate to trace out 
the ideas of representative thinkers. Two important writers who 
reject the morB:I significance of the body are Joseph Fletcher, a 
theologian, and H. Tristram Engelhardt, a philosopher. 
1. Reason, personhood, and the celebration of control: Jo-
seph Fletcher's moral theology- The theologian Joseph 
Fletcher wants to give biology its due, but not assign much, if 
any, moral significance to it. To Fletcher, the body is merely a 
necessary condition for the pursuit of the truly important pos-
sibilities in being human. Its significance is only instrumental, 
not essential. 32 
To Fletcher, mere bodily life is not particularly important to 
human worth or personhood. For this reason, Fletcher is not 
morally opposed to euthanasia. "To prolong life uselessly, while 
the personal qualities of freedom, knowledge, self-possession and 
control, and responsibility are sacrificed is to attack the moral 
status of a person."33 When the "person" suffers as a result of 
physical pain, the body becomes an impediment to the pursuit 
of important moral goods. 
A recurrent theme in Fletcher's work is a preference for 
human control over natural processes, for design and choice over 
chance, for reason over those things indifferent to reason. Dis-
cussing contraception, he asserts "the moral stature of men, 
their truly human status, is measured by their knowledge of 
their circumstances, including physical nature, and by their abil-
ity to control those circumstances toward chosen rather than fa-
tally determined ends."34 His consideration of artificial insemi-
nation begins with "the pivot principle of ethics, that man's 
moral nature, his quality as a moral being, depends first upon 
32. Typical of Fletcher is his attack on Roman Catholic teaching on contraception. 
He dismisses it as a throwback "to that counter-Reformation version of the Natural Law 
as something physiologically determined, which we have previously described as a denial 
of true morality, and as a submission to fatality and to physical (material) determin-
ism." J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 159 (1960). 
33. Id. at 191. 
34. Id. at 93. 
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his possession of freedom of choice and, second, upon his knowl-
edge of the courses of action open to his choice. "311 
Fletcher's equation of artifice and control with moral stature 
advocates the "least natural course" as the most morally ele-
vated one, that the artificiality of certain means of conception 
makes them, for that reason, preferable to natural means. 
Fletcher is even more explicit about this when he declares, "To 
be a person, to have moral being, is to have the capacity for in-
telligent causal action. It means to be free of physiology!"38 Fur-
ther, "it is precisely persons-and not souls or bodies or glands 
or human biology-that count with God and come first in 
ethics. "37 
Fletcher's article about "indicators of personhood" reinforces 
the relative unimportance of the body to moral personhood.38 He 
names fifteen positive and five negative criteria. Fourteen of the 
fifteen positive criteria are descriptions of various capaci-
ties-e.g., self-awareness, curiosity, concern for others. Only one 
directly addresses the body-a functioning neocortex. It is clear 
from the context that the neocortex is important only because it 
is the physiological substratum-the enabling condition-of the 
other fourteen criteria. 
Of the five negative criteria-those things that he asserts are 
not central to moral personhood-three may be taken to pertain 
to the human body: that persons are not "non- or anti-artificial"; 
that they are not "essentially sexual"; and that they are not "es-
sentially parental."39 
A later article, reflecting further on "Indicators for 
Humanhood," accentuates Fletcher's desire to move the body 
outside of our moral compass. He now notes that "neocortical 
function is the key to humanness, the essential trait, the human 
sine qua non. . . . Only this trait or capability is necessary to 
all of the other traits which go into the fullness of human-
ness. . . . As Robert Williams . . . puts it, 'Without mentation 
the body is of no significant use.' "40 
The split between the morally significant "stuff''- rea-
son-and the morally insignificant body could hardly be more 
35. Id. at 100. 
36. Id. at 218. 
37. Id. at 219. 
38. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP .• Nov. 1972, at 1-4. 
39. Id. at 3-4. 
40. Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Enquiry Matures, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Dec. 1974, at 4, 6. 
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radical. Fletcher's desire to control and master the body shares 
much with Plato and the Manicheans, though without the lat-
ter's leaning towards self-mortification. Fletcher would have us 
conquer the body with the aid of technology rather than tame it 
with our will. 
Given Fletcher's views about the moral insignificance of the 
body and his celebration of control and artifice, he could not 
have any objection to the commercialization of the body or its 
parts based on any intrinsic dignity the body might possess. He 
could have other objections, but they would have to be on quite 
different grounds. His view of the body and its relation to the 
moral person could not support any strong objection to using it 
for commercial gain. 
2. H. Tristram Engelhardt and the incidental, commercial-
izable body- Engelhardt's secular view of the body has much in 
common with Fletcher, the theologian. Society has no interest, 
he says, in preserving "mere biological life." In contrast to the 
brain, and particularly the neocortex, the body is "a complex, 
integrated mechanism that sustains the life of the brain, which 
sponsors the life of a person. "41 
The body is more incidental than essential, except in a mor-
ally unimportant causal sense. Engelhardt acknowledges that 
"[p]ersons, if they are not free of spatiotemporal extension (e.g., 
angels or gods), will be subject to the difficulty of integrating 
various experiences as their own," for example, sleeping and 
wakefulness.42 Engelhardt has no difficulty counting the com-
puter HAL in the movie 2001 as a person.43 Consistent with this 
are his views on personhood and brain transplants (personhood 
goes with consciousness, with the brain and not the body)"" and 
on the proper definition of death, agreeing with Fletcher that in 
humans the "person" does not survive the destruction of the 
neocortex. 45 
From all this, it is clear that for Engelhardt the body is mor-
ally important only in an incidental and derivative way. If 
mental life could exist without a body (as in HAL or angels, or 
the res cogitans of Descartes), or should the body no longer sup-
port mental life, then the body itself retains no moral signifi-
cance. "Talking about persons as spatiotemporally extended en-
tities will therefore mean regarding their intact embodiment as 
41. H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 206. 
42. Id. at 121. 
43. Id. at 205. 
44. Id. at 124. 
45. Id. at 215. 
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them, as long as that embodiment maintains the full capacities 
that are the physical substrata of moral agents.""6 We may need 
our bodies in order to be functioning moral persons, but only in 
the same sense that we need food or water. The "person" could 
not long exist without them, but they have no moral importance 
in themselves. 
This does not give us leeway to do whatever we please to the 
bodies of other "persons in the strict sense," as Engelhardt la-
bels rational, fully-functioning adults. "One cannot respect other 
moral agents, while willing to destroy their unique place in the 
world, their embodiment."47 Respect for persons, then, does pro-
vide a minimal protection against physical violence to the bodies 
of "persons in the strict sense." But that protection does not 
extend to less-than-full persons-the severely retarded, the se-
nile, infants, and fetuses-nor does it endow the body with any 
moral significance of its own. 
Engelhardt has explicit views on commercialization of the 
body. His views contrast sharply with thinkers such as Ramsey 
and Kass, for whom the special dignity of the body places it 
outside the realm of "property," of those things that may be 
bought and sold. Engelhardt cites Hegel and Locke to support 
his claim that the human body is the quintessential example of 
property, of that which we have a right to trade commercially.48 
But Engelhardt does not stop here. He extends the idea of 
embodiment to encompass those things which we own: "Embodi-
ment in this world does not stop at the edges of one's body, but 
is extended into other objects marked by one's will .... Once 
such a right is acquired, it may then be freely sold or otherwise 
transferred to others, just as persons may transfer rights over 
themselves. ""9 Engelhardt thus squarely equates the body with 
other property we might hold. He makes clear his belief that, if 
anything, our right to trade other material objects is inferior to 
and less clear than our right to trade our bodies. This right 
would permit indentured servitude, if not outright slavery. 
For Engelhardt, everything hangs on consent: "Persons own 
themselves and own other persons insofar as they have agreed to 
46. Id. at 122. 
47. Id. at 123. 
48. Of Hegel he writes, "[h]is paradigm example of possession is our possession of 
ourselves." Id. at 128. He quotes Locke: "Every man has a property in his own person: 
this nobody has any right to but himself." Id. He declares "[o]ne's body, one's talents, 
and one's abilities are similarly primordially one's own." Id. 
49. Id. at 130-31. 
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be owned."110 He explicitly denies the authority of governments 
to forbid commercial trade in bodies and their parts: "The au-
thority of governments is suspect, insofar as they . . . [r ]estrict 
the choice of free individuals without their consent (e.g., at-
tempts to forbid the sale of human organs)."111 Should the state 
try to prevent such transactions, he defends a "fundamental 
moral right to participate in the black market."112 We own our 
bodies and may commercialize them as we wish, according to 
Engelhardt. There exists no state authority for interfering in 
that commercialization, and there is a moral right to defy any 
such efforts at state control. 
Against the view that the body is unconnected with whatever 
gives moral significance to persons are an array of philosophical 
and religious traditions that affirm the moral importance of the 
body. 
C. The Person Has/ls A Body 
Aristotle, Plato's student, held that the body is intimately and 
perhaps unseverably connected to the soul, the source of moral 
significance. For Aristotle, body and soul were two aspects of a 
single entity: "a body which possesses life."113 
The Hebraic understanding of the body is much closer to Ar-
istotle than to Plato. There is no strict correspondence between 
the Hebrew word for "body," basar, and the Greek words for 
"body," soma, and "flesh," sarc. The mismatch is so great that 
eleven different Hebrew words in the Septuagint are translated 
into soma, while basar is more often translated as sarc than 
soma. H The Greek idea of humankind as "an angel in a slot ma-
chine"1111 contrasts with the "Hebrew idea of personality" as "an 
animated body, and not an incarnated soul."116 
According to one commentator, Saint Paul subscribed to the 
Hebrew conception of the body even as he used the Greek lan-
guage to express this conception. The person has different as-
pects, but it is always one and the same person. The fleshly body 
50. Id. at 134. 
51. Id. at 144. 
52. Id. at 135. 
53. Long, supra note 27, at 4. 
54. J. ROBINSON, THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY 11-12 (Studies in Biblical 
Theology No. 5, 1952). 
55. Id. at 14. 
56. Robinson, Hebrew Psychology, in THE PEOPLE AND THE BooK 362 (A. Peake ed. 
1925). 
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is intimately bound up with the source of moral importance, the 
soul.67 
Hellenic philosophy, as well as Judaism and Christianity, em-
brace a tradition that refuses to separate radically the body from 
the "person." The works of two modern writers, the first a theo-
logian, the second, secular, explore how this tradition deals with 
contemporary debates over the commercial exploitation of the 
body. 
1. Ensouled body, embodied soul: personhood and the body 
in the moral theology of Paul Ramsey- "Just as man is a sa-
credness ·in the social and political order, so he is a sacredness 
in the natural, biological order. He is a sacredness in bodily life. 
He is an embodied soul or ensouled body."118 So argues Paul 
Ramsey in the preface to The Patient As Person. For Ramsey, a 
Christian theologian, respect for the human body as an insepara-
ble part of the person is an important moral duty grounded in 
the respect due to all persons created by God. 
Ramsey's respect for the body leads to reservations about the 
morality of organ donations by living donors. Anticipating the 
objection of excessive "physicalism," he responds that we cannot 
avoid giving due weight to the physical harm done the donor 
because "the only human life we know to respect, protect, and 
serve in medical care is irremediably physical, and presented to 
us with its moral claims solely within the ambience of a bodily 
existenc~. "69 
Ramsey has equally deep qualms about policies that would re-
move organs from the newly dead without the consent of the 
donor while living and the family upon death. Even with con-
sent, he cautions that we cannot "think of our bodies as an en-
semble of parts left behind, like old clothes, to be given away or 
taken or-worst of all-sold. . . . Proper respect for the body is 
irremovably a part of respect for the sanctity of the life of all 
flesh."60 Ramsey is profoundly concerned about humankind's 
propensity to regard the body as an instrument, as incidental to 
the moral person: 
[T]here are many refined and subtle ways by which men 
may be encouraged or allowed to treat themselves as 
parts only, or collections of parts, in the service of medi-
cal progress or societal value to come. In terms of our vi-
57. J. ROBINSON, supra note 54, at 18. 
58. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON xiii (1970). 
59. Id. at 191. 
60. Id. at 208. 
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sion of man and his relation to community, there may be 
little to choose between the blood and soil, organic view 
of the Nazis and the technological, "spare parts," mech-
anistic analogies of the present day.61 
Ramsey criticizes those Protestant and Catholic theologians 
who, he believes, give too little emphasis to the fact of our em-
bodiment. These theologians contribute to the "technological" 
view of human bodily existence. Their writings 
simply baptize the Cartesian mentalism and dualism of 
mind (soul, person) and body that is endemic to the 
modern mentality and an epidemic afflicting almost all 
contemporary outlooks. Our culture is already prepared 
for technocratizing the bodily life into collections of parts 
in which consciousness somehow has residence for a • 
time. . . . The contagious dualism of modern culture has 
already placed ... [man], as a spiritual overlord, too far 
above his physical life. To most of us a part of the body 
or the bodily life as a whole is already only a thing-in-
the-world, not to be identified with the person.62 
Ramsey is implacably opposed to commercialization of the 
human body, or, at least, its vital organs. This stems from his 
view of the body's irrevocable connection to the person, that the 
body is a "sacredness" in the biological order. The body's sacred 
state requires that it be treated with respect; it also makes the 
commercialization of the body morally repugnant. 
Ramsey discusses the notion of a kin's "quasi-property right" 
to control the disposition of the body for burial in Anglo-Ameri-
can common law. He argues persuasively that this right "was 
'quasi' in that possession for commercial purposes was still de-
nied. . . . [The body] was a sort of 'property' in that possession 
for a certain human and familial purpose was assigned and le-
gally protected. The latter was the positive human value and in-
terest at stake"63-not permitting commercial exploitation, not 
even at the wish of the person whose body it is, or was. 
Should the body become the object of commercial trade, Ram-
sey paints an ugly portrait: 
61. Id. at 168. 
62. Id. at 193. 
63. Id. at 204. 
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No longer will survivors "possess" the body for a sacred 
trust that possesses them, namely the right and duty to 
give decent burial, to which have been added the clear 
right and perhaps the duty to give organs of the dece-
dent, as another sort of sacred trust, to prolong the lives 
of others. 64 
Lest there be any uncertainty about his position, Ramsey warns 
against a situation where "the bodies of our fellow men have 
been reduced to the property of another, or that the so-called 
'consent' to premortem or postmortem organ donation was co-
erced or tempted by commercial gain. . . . We cannot too 
strongly oppose 'the potentially dehumanizing abuses of a mar-
ket in human flesh.' "611 
Although Ramsey's discussion of cadaver organs does not di-
rectly address what to do with other, non vital parts of living 
bodies, there is little reason to believe that he would regard 
other commercial uses any more favorably. His opposition to 
commercialization is grounded in both a belief in the sacredness 
of the body as an essential part of the sacred person, and a con-
viction that sacred things must not be made the object of com-
merce. So committed is he to the idea of sacredness and bodily 
integrity that he proposes, only half-facetiously, that organs 
donated by living donors be regarded as merely on "loan," to be 
returned to the giver upon the death of the recipient.66 Ramsey 
makes this proposal to emphasize the importance of bodily in-
tegrity and the wrong done when integrity is violated, even for 
such a great good as preserving the life of another. For him, only 
a great preponderance of good could justify harming a live 
donor. 
Ramsey gives reasons that suggest he would have strong objec-
tions to the profanation of the body for commercial gain. His 
discussion of living organ donors asks, does the body belong to 
the person? His answer: yes. For living or cadaver donors, may 
parts of the body be sold? His answer: no. 
2. Leon Kass and the "more natural science"- Leon Kass, 
a physician and philosopher, calls to task both corporealists, who 
view the body as all important, and theorists of personhood, 
consciousness, and autonomy, who discount the value of the 
body. Kass notes that the corporealist "seeks to capture man for 
64. Id. at 214. 
65. Id. at 215 (quoting Ledenberg, Biological Future of Man, in MAN AND His Fu-
TURE 268 (G. Wolstenholme ed. 1963)). 
66. Id. at 195 n.42. 
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dumb and mindless nature" while "the latter treats man in iso-
lation, even from his own nature. "67 
In his book, Toward a More Natural Science,68 Kass attempts 
to develop a philosophy of medicine and a medical ethics based 
upon what he believes are insights that come from a correct un-
derstanding of the body. Both are thoroughly secular, and in 
that respect distinct from both Ramsey and Fletcher. But in his 
rejection of Cartesian dualism, his suspicion of artifice, and his 
embrace of a concept of the body that stresses its dignity, Kass 
has much in common with Ramsey and little in common with 
Fletcher or Engelhardt. He finds part of his inspiration in the 
way physicians regard the body: "Doctors respect the integrity 
of the body not only because and if the patient wants or allows 
them to. They respect and minister to bodily wholeness because 
.they recognize, at least tacitly, what a wonderful and awe-inspir-
ing-not to say sacred-thing the healthy living human body 
is."69 Kass echoes Ramsey's sentiments, with a secular overtone, 
when he writes of "that mystery of mysteries which is its own 
ground: the being of an embodied mind or a thoughtful body."70 
On secular rather than theological grounds (though without 
eschewing theological language), Kass agrees with Ramsey in ty-
ing our embodiment to our moral worthiness: 
Our dignity consists not in denying but in thoughtfully 
acknowledging and elevating the necessity of our embodi-
ment, rightly regarding it as a gift to be cherished and 
respected. Through ceremonious treatment of mortal re-
mains and through respectful attention to our living body 
and its inherent worth, we stand rightly when we stand 
reverently before the body, both living and dead.71 
Kass finds a suitable example of his theory in the experiences 
of medical students upon confronting, for the first time, the ca-
daver they will be dissecting. Their comments revealed that 
"[t]hey understood and felt that they were engaged in something 
fundamentally disrespectful-albeit in a good cause."72 But "all 
these responses-perfectly natural ones to a layman-are en-
tirely inappropriate and unreasonable . . . on the scientific view 
67. L. KASS, supra note 1, at 277. 
68. L. KASS, supra note 1. 
69. Id. at 198. 
70. Id. at 295. 
71. Id. at 294. 
72. Id. at 278. 
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of the body that our medical students are taught and to which 
they adhere."73 Science regards the body as "[e]xtended matter 
in necessary and purposeless motion, organized by necessity on 
an inherited plan and functioning as pure mechanism."" In life, 
the body is "no object for shame, awe, or respect. And in death, 
it is a gradually decaying, inoperative, worthless heap of finally 
homogeneous ·stuff."711 
For Kass, the body has profound significance. "[E]ven the 
dead body ... is more than our present science can say."76 The 
living body needs to be appreciated as "an organic whole; as 
lively and self-moving; as a personal center of awareness, felt 
need, and self-concern; as a vehicle of individuated self-presen-
tation and communication. "77 
What is the relationship of the human being to this body: that 
of the owner to property? Kass poses a series of questions: 
What kind of property is my body? Is it mine or is it me? 
Can it be alienated, like my other property, like my car 
or even my dog? And on what basis do I claim property 
rights in my body? Have I labored to produce it? Less 
than did my mother, and yet it is not hers. Do I claim it 
on merit? Doubtful: I had it even before I could be said 
to be deserving. Do I hold it as a gift-whether or not 
there be a giver? How does one possess and use a gift? Is 
it mine to dispose of as I wish-especially if I do not 
know the answer to these questions?76 
Kass makes clear his skepticism about treating the body as com-
mercial property. Discussing reproductive technologies in gen-
eral and surrogate motherhood for pay specifically, Kass objects: 
"The buying and selling of human flesh and the dehumanized 
uses of the human body ought not to be encouraged."79 "Appre-
ciating the meaning of our embodiment, institutionalized al-
ready in our taboos on cannibalism and incest, would lead us to 
oppose the buying and selling of human organs .... "80 This 
position is tied to his general repugnance at the notion of own-






78. Id. at 283. 
79. Id. at 114. 
80. Id. at 348. 
1074 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
permitting the patenting of life illustrate. He worries about indi-
viduals owning entire living kinds, for example, microorganisms. 
He sees no natural stopping place between Chakrabarty's bacte-
rium81 and homo sapiens, once we permit the ownership of living 
nature. He asks: "If a genetically engineered organism may be 
owned because it was genetically engineered, what would we 
conclude about a genetically altered or engineered human 
being?"82 
Kass's adamant refusal to separate the body from what gives 
us our dignity (indeed, his premise that we can learn a great deal 
about human dignity and moral conduct from looking carefully 
at what the body means), coupled with his reluctance to permit 
commercializing of the body or treating "living nature" in gen-
eral as something that should be reduced to mere property, to-
gether create a secular argument that strongly links the body to 
human dignity. It also raises doubts about the moral acceptabil-
ity of commercializing the human body. 
D. The Body and Moral Dignity 
If we follow the traditions that portray the body as unessen-
tial to moral personhood, we cannot find anything intrinsic to 
the body that makes it unsuitable for commerce. If, on the other 
hand, we follow those traditions that refuse to separate the body 
from what is morally important about us, there is a strong prima 
facie moral argument against markets in the body and its parts. 
We could interpret the common law dealing with dead bodies 
and body parts as well as recent state and federal statutes for-
bidding commercial trade in transplantable organs as evidence 
that our culture has opted for the view that the body, at least as 
a whole or in its symbolically significant manifestations, has a 
moral "dignity" and therefore should not become an object of 
commerce. But there is other evidence that we do not view all 
trade in body parts with the same seriousness-e.g., hair, nail-
clippings, plasma, and semen. Even if we resort to the fiction 
with plasma and semen that we are trading in a service rather 
than a commodity,83 it is clear that some markets in body prod-
ucts are tolerated. To understand the importance of markets in 
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
82. L. KASS, supra note 1, at 151. 
83. OTA, supra note 17, at 76. Payment for semen and plasma is treated as a sale of 
a service rather than a commodity for the purpose of avoiding product liability actions. 
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bodies or their parts, we must examine the moral underpin-
nings-and limitations-of markets. 
Ill. COMMERCIALIZING THE BODY AND THE COMMON GOOD 
Aside from their contribution to liberty, the most important 
moral argument in favor of markets is that they promote the 
common good by permitting each individual to choose that ac-
tion most likely to maximize his or her own good. In philosophi-
cal shorthand, markets are believed to promote beneficence.8" 
As in the case of arguments based on respect for persons, most 
beneficence-based arguments on commercializing the human 
body focus on transplantable organs. This introduces some im-
portant disanalogies with the most probable uses of human tis-
sues in biotechnology-that, compared to, say, transplantable 
kidneys, most such tissues will not need to be taken by intrusive 
means, will not pose major risks to the person supplying the tis-
sue, and will not be so dramatically lifesaving to the recipient. 
These disanalogies will not affect the arguments in favor of per-
mitting commercialization, but they may weaken some of the ar-
guments against commercialization, particularly those that de-
pend either on the harm done the supplier, or on the lifesaving 
nature of the good. Some strong beneficence-based objections 
will remain, however. 
A. Some Needed Distinctions Among Types of Markets 
Anticipating all the kinds of markets in human biological 
materials that might arise were commercialization permitted is 
an awesome task. The various "goods" that could be traded 
might affect our view of the consequences of permitting such a 
market. For one thing, body-goods vary in their "cost" to the 
supplier. At one extreme, we could imagine a person selling a 
vital, nonduplicated organ, such as a liver or heart. At the other 
end of the scale are transactions in human materials that do not 
impose any significant risks on the supplier, and may be so in-
nocuous that supplying them is no more than an inconvenience. 
Human waste anchors this end of the scale, with blood some 
small distance up. Bone marrow removal entails pain or the 
84. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 148-79 
(2d ed. 1983). 
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need for anesthesia, but the prospect of long-term harm is mini-
mal. Thus, bone marrow probably falls in the middle of the 
scale. Kidneys probably sit near the higher end of the scale in 
terms of harm (pain, incapacitation during recuperation) and 
risk ( the chance of the remaining kidney becoming dysfunc-
tional). 
Body-goods could also vary in their "value" to recipients, ei-
ther in the usual sense of monetary value, which markets are 
efficient in handling, or in nonmonetary, lifesaving value, which 
monetary markets may not produce or distribute in efficient or 
acceptable ways. 
The distinction between "cost" to supplier and "value" to re-
cipient alerts us to a distinction between the procedures used to 
determine how much of a good to produce, which I will call a 
production market, and the procedures used to distribute the 
good, which I will call an allocation market. 
It is quite possible to use a market for production but not for 
allocation, or vice versa. For example, we could have a market to 
"produce" (acquire) transplantable kidneys, but distribute them 
according to some nonmonetary judgments of neediness. Or we 
could procure kidneys through some nonmarket system such as 
what we now have, but sell them to the highest bidders. I am not 
advocating either of these approaches, but it is crucial to under-
stand that beneficence-based objections to markets in organs 
can focus on either production or allocation markets, or both. 
For example, objections to markets in transplantable kidneys 
may emphasize that the wealthy are more likely to receive kid-
neys (allocation) or that the poor are more likely to sell them 
(production). 
To escape from some of the peculiar characteristics of the pro-
duction and allocation of transplantable kidneys, consider a pos-
sible market in bone marrow for transplantation. Marrow is 
replenishable; although donation is painful and onerous, it does 
not carry significant long-term risks. Should bone marrow trans-
plantation become perfected and its efficacy proven, then ft 
could become a life-prolonging or even lifesaving good for recipi-
ents. In a production market for bone marrow, we could reasona-
bly suppose that the poor would be more willing to undergo the 
pain of marrow extraction than would the wealthy, as is the case 
with the sale of plasma. 
This correlation of wealth with the willingness to sell need not 
bother market proponents, because all the usual arguments 
about markets allowing each individual to pursue his or her own 
good would still apply. As long as sellers participate voluntarily, 
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market advocates can maintain that they do so because the sell-
ers believe selling their marrow maximizes benefits to 
themselves. 
B. Benefits from Commercialization 
Advocates of the market argue that allowing rational individu-
als the freedom to conduct whatever transactions they wish will 
promote beneficence.811 Rational, free individuals will agree only 
to those transactions that they believe will maximize their own 
good. A society of individuals free to engage in such markets will 
maximize beneficence more effectively than a society that re-
stricts this freedom. 86 
The argument that beneficence is promoted by permitting 
market transactions is a strong one. Even allowing for imperfec-
tions, a market in human biologicals could come closer to accom-
plishing what efficient markets do than would alternative 
schemes for determining production and allocation. The market 
permits the quantity produced to match the quantity demanded 
at an equilibrium price. This price reflects the economic value of 
the material to sellers and buyers. Are there any beneficence-
based reasons to object to this? 
85. For a sophisticated discussion of ethics and markets, see A. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, 
EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET (1985). 
86. This is, of course, a version of the "invisible hand" theory of Adam Smith. Not all · 
economists believe it in its pure form. Paul Samuelson, for example, suggests that were 
Smith alive today, he would reformulate his doctrine to take into account at least four 
ways in which markets do not "successfully channel individuals who selfishly seek their 
own interest into promoting the 'public interest' .... " P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 634 
(10th ed. 1976). These amendments include: 
(1) the assumption that "abilities and dollar-wealth votes were distributed in 'an ethi-
cally optimal manner' -and kept so distributed by nondistorting, nonmarket 
interventions"; 
(2) the admission that "the demands of people in the marketplace sometimes do not 
reflect their true well-beings as these would be interpreted by even the most tolerant and 
individualistic observers"; 
(3) that "monopolistic imperfections . . . produce deviations from ideal competitive mar-
ginal-cost pricing ... " and are "practically inevitable" in certain situations; and 
(4) that external economies and diseconomies sometimes create a "prima facie case" for 
intervening in the market. 
Id. at 634-35. 
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C. Beneficence-Based Objections to Commercialization 
There are two types of beneficence-based objections to com-
mercialization. The first focuses on the assumptions of the mar-
ket model, such as freedom and rationality; the second grants 
the assumptions, but argues that wider, indirect effects of com-
mercialization are preponderantly negative. 
1. Assumptions of the market model- Individuals may not 
maximize their own well-being through market transactions. 
First, the assumption that people are :rational consumers is dubi-
ous. Ample evidence exists of irrational human behavior. Al-
though this is not a great problem when the commodity being 
traded is a VCR or a cake mix, irrational trade in human biolog-
ical materials is a more serious matter. 
Second, although the assumptions of freedom and rationality 
might be warranted for most adults, there are large classes of 
people, including children, the mentally ill, and the mentally 
disabled, for whom the assumptions are clearly unjustified. 
These people might participate in body part production or allo-
cation markets. Given their inability to consent to the use of 
their bodies, including invasive procedures necessary to obtain 
commercially valuable materials, their participation as sellers 
seems morally questionable. Society must decide whether to ban 
such people as suppliers, make provisions for their limited par-
ticipation, or endure the spectacle of unlimited use of the bodies 
of such nonconsenting suppliers. 
Third, abuse is likely. In every human interaction, including 
all market interactions, there is the possibility of abuse-fraud, 
misrepresentation, coercion, etc. This is not peculiar to markets 
in human materials, but it may be that abuse in this realm is 
more morally repugnant than it would be with other goods. 
Lastly, there may be a discrepancy between what people de-
sire and what they need;87 that is, between what even rational 
and free consumers might pursue in a market, and what those 
individuals need to promote their genuine well-being. If it is 
morally important to satisfy human needs, and to promote 
human flourishing, then the inability of markets to distinguish 
between needs and desires is a problem. 
Taken together, the assumptions that consumers are always 
rational, the existence of frankly nonautonomous participants, 
87. Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, in IN SEARCH or EQUITY: 
HEALTH NEEDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 8-9 (R. Rayer, A. Caplan & N. Daniels 
eds. 1983). 
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the specter of abuses, and the discrepancy between need and de-
sire create doubts about whether body markets will, in fact, en-
hance beneficence. 
2. Wider problems with the market model- The second 
type of beneficence-based objections ask about the wider effects 
of commercialization, particularly of the human body. They 
evoke "externalities," in the economist's lingo, though not exter-
nalities that are translatable into money. The "costs" are moral 
rather than monetary. Paul Ramsey anticipated this type of ob-
jection when he wrote: 
Survivors may have gained a lucrative asset in the body. 
How lucrative will depend on supply and demand, the 
maldistribution or fortunate location of potential donors 
and needy recipients, the wealth and social status of re-
cipients, the strength of their will to live, and the cun-
ning of family members when they give telephonic 
consent.88 
Implicit in Ramsey's comment is an objection that commer-
cialization of the body will lead to disrespect, devaluation, and 
desecration of the human body. This argument is not especially 
persuasive to those who believe that the biological body does not 
deserve such special respect in the first place-modern Carte-
sians, such as Fletcher and Engelhardt, or other body market 
proponents. 89 
A second objection implicit in Ramsey's remarks is that com-
mercialization will somehow threaten our ideals of equality, not 
through any explicit declaration in favor of inequality, but be-
cause, in a society where wealth is unequally distributed, the 
costs of production and benefits of allocation will be unequally 
distributed as well. Whether such inequalities come to be seen 
as morally unacceptable inequities will depend on a number of 
factors having to do with the regnant ideals of the culture, the 
history of related decisions, and the nature of the good being 
allocated. When inequalities lead de facto to distributions of 
production costs and allocation benefits that correlate with 
other, morally unacceptable forms of unequal treatment, then 
society is likely to find its fundamental values threatened. For 
example, when the poor are the suppliers of human biological 
materials and the wealthy are the beneficiaries of their alloca-
88. P. RAMSEY, supra note 58, at 214. 
89. See supra notes 3, 32-52 and accompanying text. 
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tion, the resulting correlation between risks and poverty, wealth 
and benefit, would challenge a very important conception of 
equality in the United States.90 
Third, some commentators react to Ramsey's assertion that "a 
society would be better and more civilized [if man] joined to-
gether routinely in making cadaver organs available to prolong 
the lives of others [rather than doing it] for the monetary gain of 
the 'donor.' "91 Joel Feinberg, a legal and moral philosopher, for 
example, objects strenuously to Ramsey's thesis: 
On the one side of the scale is the saving of human lives; 
on the other is the right of a person-not simply to grant 
or withhold his consent to the uses of his body after his 
death . . . -but his power by the use of a symbolic ritual 
to convert his consent into genuine "gift." Even in this 
extreme confrontation of interest with symbol, Ramsey 
gives the symbol more weight. If the subject were not it-
self so grim I might be tempted to charge him with 
sentimentality.92 
Although Feinberg was responding specifically to Ramsey's 
opposition to the routine taking of organs, his objection to pre-
ferring sentiment over genuine interests would apply with equal 
force against the argument in favor of preferring gift transac-
tions over market ones, if the market increased the supply of 
transplantable organs. It is true that Ramsey's argument relies 
upon an unprovable empirical premise-that moving from gift 
to market in human organs carries with it such important losses 
to the common good that the losses will, on the whole, outweigh 
the benefits. Although Ramsey's premise may not be proven eas-
ily, neither is it absurd or easily disproven.93 
A final beneficence-based objection relates to the specific case 
of human biological materials donated for research to charitable 
90. G. CALABRESI & P. BossrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-25 (1978). William May, a promi-
nent moral theologian, describes a part of what is meant here when, in discussing the 
sale of human tissues, he refers to "the tawdriness of a social system that reduces people 
to that kind of action." May, Religious Justifications for Donating Body Parts, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 41. His obvious disgust, which we could assume would 
be shared by many individuals, is an "externality" implicit in any commercialization of 
human biological materials. 
91. P. RAMSEY, supra note 58, at 215. 
92. Feinberg, supra note 5, at 32. 
93. For a more thorough discussion of what may be lost when markets are substi-
tuted for donation systems and when the "commodity" in question is blood, transplant-
able organs, or tissues, see Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, 30-38. 
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institutions, for example, university-based biomedical research. 
The shift from a gift to a market basis could have damaging con-
sequences in the cost and availability of such materials, public 
perception of and generosity towards biomedical researchers, 
and increased suspicion of the motives of health providers who 
seek to use one's biological materials.94 
Markets can be very efficient means for producing and distrib-
uting commodities. But there are ample reasons to worry 
whether they are the best means of "producing" or distributing 
bodies or body parts. One of the most important considerations 
is the impact of commercialization on justice. 
D. Justice and the Commercialization of the Human Body 
There are distinct questions of justice in both production and 
allocation processes. To complicate matters further, there are 
many accounts of justice, each of which commands a certain 
amount of respect and a set of adherents. Calabresi and Bobbitt, 
in their influential book Tragic Choices,9 r, correctly say that a 
society such as ours subscribes to several, incompatible ideals of 
justice.96 Indeed, each individual probably holds multiple and 
competing notions of justice. Society cannot "read off'' the ethi-
cal implications of commercializing human biologicals from a 
"correct" theory of justice. It is possible, though, to contrast two 
important, opposed views. 
Libertarian theorists, on the one hand, emphasize the 
processes of exchange, and deny that the unequal distributions 
resulting from a series of "fair" exchanges could be unjust. Rob-
ert Nozick has provided much of the recent intellectual energy 
for this view,97 and H. Tristram Engelhardt has elaborated the 
implications of Nozick's theory for issues such as whether a mar-
ket in human organs would be just. We will examine Engel-
hardt's views on justice and the commercialization of the human 
body. 
On the other hand are theorists, such as Rawls,98 who believe 
that there are constraints on permissible exchanges in addition 
to freedom, and who also believe that there may be specific limi-
94. Murray, Who Owns the Body?: On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Com-
mercial Purposes, IRB, Jan./Feb. 1986, at 1, 1-5. 
95. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBI'IT, supra note 90. 
96. Id. at 38-40. 
97. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
98. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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tations on the institutions a just society may have. Other theo-
rists such as Daniels99 and Vlastos100 focus on the distribution of 
at least some goods-especially those goods necessary to the ful-
fillment of basic human needs. Vlastos's theory, rather than the 
more familiar one of Rawls (or Daniels' elaboration of it for 
health care policy), offers a more direct contrast with libertarian 
views in its account of what it means to properly respect 
persons. 
Engelhardt's views on justice and the commercialization of the 
body are tied intimately to his notions of respect for persons and 
private property. His views rest on the fundamental importance 
of autonomy, understood as the free choice of rational persons, 
and his idea of property, having as its paradigm case the owner-
ship of one's own body.101 It should be clear that, given these 
premises, interfering with commercial trade in one's own biologi-
cal materials-including organs-would be perhaps the clearest 
and gravest affront to justice imaginable.102 
Engelhardt is unconcerned if this free market results in the 
poor selling and the rich buying. Interfering with the free 
choices of individuals is a violation of justice. The pattern of dis-
tribution is not relevant to justice; indeed, the very notion of 
"distributive" justice, of unjust patterns of distribution obtained 
from exchanges not in themselves unjust, seems incoherent m 
this theory. 
This result follows almost unavoidably from the concept of 
the person as a radically individual satisfaction-maximizer, and 
from the notion that respecting persons means, most of all, not 
interfering in transactions to which rational, satisfaction-maxi-
mizing individuals agree. The libertarian theory of justice says in 
effect that commercial trade in body parts is the essence of jus-
tice, and that those who would interfere with it have an exceed-
ingly heavy burden of proof on their shoulders. The more tradi-
tional maxims of distributive justice-to each according to need, 
99. N. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985). 
100. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31-72 (R. Brandt ed. 1962). 
101. For a discussion of Engelhardt's work, see notes 41-52 and accompanying text. 
102. 
Since selling oneself freely to another does not involve a violation of the princi-
ple of autonomy, such transactions should fall within the protected privacy of 
free individuals on the basis of the principle of autonomy. In addition, if one 
sells oneself at the right price and under the proper circumstances, one would 
suspect that one could maximize one's balance of benefits over harms. But the 
point in principle is that free individuals should be able to dispose of themselves 
freely. 
H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 366. 
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worth, merit, or work-are replaced by to each according to the 
agreements he has freely made. 
In contrast to libertarians such as Engelhardt, Vlastos defends 
an egalitarian theory of justice. His theory has the merit of being 
based on a powerful and clear view of respect for persons. In its 
emphasis on respect for persons, Vlastos's theory of justice 
shares a fundamental presumption with libertarians such as En-
gelhardt, but reaches very different conclusions. 
It is not possible here to lay out the whole of Vlastos's theory 
of equalitarian justice, but a few central points can be noted. 
First, his theory rests on a concept of natural or human rights, 
"which are human not in the trivial sense that those who have 
them are men, but in the challenging sense that in order to have 
them they need only be men."103 These human rights are prima 
facie claims, to be respected even when not explicitly invoked. 
There are also other moral rights-for example, the rights at-
taching to an elected office-that have similar moral force but 
do not stem from the mere fact of one's humanity. 
Second, these human rights emerge from a concept of individ-
ual moral worth as inalienable and as not admitting of degrees 
in the way judgments of excellence or merit must. All humans 
are of equal, and everywhere immeasurable, moral worth. Vlas-
tos argues for the propositions that "one man's well-being is as 
valuable as any other's" and "one man's freedom is as valuable 
as any other's. "10• From these reasonable propositions, he claims 
that "the prima facie equality of men's right to well-being and 
to freedom" follows. 1011 
Tl\ird, he offers this definition of justice: "An action is just if, 
and only if, it is prescribed exclusively by regard for the rights of 
all whom it affects substantially."106 This definition is broad 
enough to encompass theorists as far from Vlastos as Engel-
hardt. Their disagreement will come over what rights must be 
considered. Libertarians will elevate freedom, including the free-
dom to own and transfer property, over all other rights. Equal-
itarians like Vlastos argue that other rights have equally strong 
claims. 
Fourth, Vlastos argues that some inequalities can be justified 
precisely on the grounds of justice; that is, that the very reasons 
for saying that we have equal moral worth and equal rights to 
103. Vlastos, supra note 100, at 91. 
104. Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted). 
105. Id. at 52. 
106. Id. at 53. 
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well-being and freedom can also, under certain empirical circum-
stances, justify limited forms of inequality. He gives the example 
of "merit-praise"-praise for excellence. Because all persons 
have equal worth, and therefore equal right to the means of 
well-being, it would be unjust to refuse a practice like merit-
praise when that practice would increase the general availability 
of the means to well-being by spurring people onto excellence 
and productivity in all spheres.107 
Finally, by showing that certain inequalities may be justified 
within an equalitarian theory of justice, Vlastos both establishes 
the credibility of such a theory, and shows how society can iden-
tify and condemn unjustified inequalities. Society does this by 
examining practices to see if the practices deny or diminish the 
equal moral worth of individuals or groups of persons, or if they 
otherwise enhance or impede satisfaction of the demands of 
justice. 
Vlastos gives the following example: "Any practice which 
tends to so weaken and confuse the personal self esteem of a 
group of persons-slavery, serfdom or, in our own time, racial 
segregation-may be morally condemned" on the grounds that 
"men may be made to feel that they are the human inferiors of 
others, that their own happiness or freedom has inferior worth." 
This, he says, "would be a grave injustice.mos 
To the extent that commercial trade in human biologicals 
makes people feel that "they are the human inferiors of others," 
that practice would be unjust. Permitting an allocation market 
in lifesaving or life-prolonging human biologicals would probably 
have this effect by allowing the wealthy to outbid the poor for 
life itself. A production market in the body and its parts could 
also have this effect if, as it seems probable, it would lead to the 
poor selling more than the rich. 
Ironically, we seem to have come full circle. If we are con-
firmed Cartesians, believing that the body is merely an inciden-
tal appurtenance to what is morally significant about per-
sons-their rationality-then those aspects of commercialization 
likely to lead to differential participation in the body-market 
will not seem offensive, precisely because the body is not partic-
ularly connected to our moral worth. If, on the other hand, we 
believe respect for persons includes respect for the human body, 
107. Id. at 63-64. 
108. Id. at 71. 
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then those empirical properties of the market do pose a grave 
threat to justice. 109 
Justice, though, is not the only moral category relevant to our 
interrelationships. It may be that the fact of our shared embodi-
ment is one of the most significant bonds holding us together in 
the face of the powerful centrifugal forces of mass bureaucratic 
society. 
IV. COMMUNITY, THE BODY, AND THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 
No society exists solely through market relationships. Not ev-
erything should be put up for sale. Even in a thoroughly market 
dominated society, justice must not be dispensed to the highest 
bidder, lest the very foundations of that society be threatened. 110 
The law and economics movement may find a market based 
analysis a useful tool, procrustean in its flexibility, but pleas for 
universal markets are still rare. Few, if any, advocate selling 
children or selling oneself into slavery. Some things, it appears, 
should not be left to the vicissitudes of the market. The question 
here is: Is the body, or at least some of its parts, unsuitable for 
the market? 
Proponents of markets in human body parts argue that the 
freedom to buy and sell organs and the like is an exercise of 
individual liberty that the law ought to endorse, or at least not 
prohibit. m They fail to recognize that, as the historian Michael 
Ignatieff has said, "We need justice, we need liberty, and we 
need as much solidarity as can be reconciled with justice and 
liberty."112 Gifts of the body are one of the most significant 
means mass societies have to affirm the solidarity, or commu-
nity, that humans need in order to mature and to flourish as 
individuals.113 
A crucial distinction is that between gift and contract. The 
contract is a device constructed to regulate a class of human in-
teractions where the goal is to trade goods or services while min-
imizing the entanglements of personal relationships. It is diffi-
cult to imagine massive market societies conducting their 
business without contracts. The mistake made by some champi-
109. Murray, On the Ethics of Commercializing the Human Body (Apr. 1986) (paper 
prepared for the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment). 
110. See, e.g., Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. Pue. AFF. 343 (1972). 
111. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 48-50, 52 and accompanying text. 
112. M. IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 141 (1985). 
113. Murray, supra note 93, at 35-37. 
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ons of the market is to take the idea of contract, designed as it is 
to minimize the relational aspects of human encounters, and use 
it as a metaphor for thinking about and governing the full range 
of human relationships.114 
In fact, contract is a very poor metaphor for many types of 
human relationships. The realm of personal relationships, for 
example, is regulated by the "ethics" and the "economics" of 
gifts, rather than by contracts.1111 By gifts, I do not mean the 
thin notion in Anglo-American jurisprudence described, for ex-
ample, in The Oxford English Dictionary as "[t]he transference 
of property in a thing by one person to another, voluntarily and 
without any valuable consideration."116 Nor do I mean the ap-
parently onerous conception manifest in Ralph Waldo Emer-
son's essay on gifts: "It is not the office of a man to receive gifts. 
How dare you give them? We wish to be self sustained. We do 
not quite forgive a giver."117 Rather, I want to emphasize the 
constructive role gift exchanges play as a powerful social prac-
tice regulating the initiation and maintenance of personal 
relationships. 
Anthropologists have studied the central role gifts play in 
traditional societies.118 Although the function of gifts in contem-
porary industrialized societies may be less obvious, a close study 
of gift practices shows that they retain their crucial role in regu-
lating personal relationships, and that we have a highly nuanced 
ethic and etiquette of gift-exchange, even if we often are oblivi-
ous to its importance.119 
More problematic is the phenomenon of impersonal 
gifts-gifts to strangers. We can understand personal gifts in 
terms of their value in creating and sustaining personal relation-
ships. The motivation for such personal gifts is a combination of 
generosity and self-interest. But what could motivate impersonal 
gifts, and what function could they serve? Despite the difficulty 
in explaining them, examples of impersonal gifts abound. Ameri-
cans give extensively to charities of many types, from umbrella 
114. Engelhardt appears to make this mistake. H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 6, at 85, 
87. See generally id. at 66-103. 
115. See supra notes 41-52, 113 and accompanying text. 
116. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 156 (1961). 
117. R. EMERSON, Gifts, in COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 159, 162 
(1979). 
118. The locus classicus for anthropological discussions of gifts is M. MAUSS, THE 
GIFT (1967). More recent discussions may be found in M. SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 
(1972), and in L. HYDE, THE GIFT (1983). 
119. See, e.g., Camenisch, Gift and Gratitude in Ethics, 9 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 1 
(1981); L. HYDE, supra note 118. 
0 
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organizations such as the United Way, to food banks, churches, 
colleges and universities, and many other organizations. Perhaps 
most remarkable among the impersonal gifts is the gift of blood. 
Approximately eight million Americans donate one or more 
units of blood every year.120 In 1971, Titmuss published a con-
troversial study comparing the blood procurement system in 
England and the United States. 121 At that time, much of the 
United States' blood supply came through "blood insurance" 
programs in which donors were promised that blood would be 
available to them and their families if needed; in addition, some 
came through paid donors, and some from volunteers. England, 
by contrast, relied exclusively on volunteer donors. Titmuss 
claimed that not only was the British system morally superior, 
but it yielded blood of better quality. A decade later Drake and 
colleagues published a defense of the United States' blood pro-
curement system, calling into question a number of Titmuss's 
claims.122 More important for this analysis, though, are the con-
clusions Drake reached with respect to the motivation of blood 
donors in the United States. In the 1970's, the United States 
went from a blood procurement system premised on self-interest 
to one based on individuals' willingness to give. By 1982, only 
three to four percent of whole blood was obtained from paid do-
nors and that percentage was declining. 123 Where local efforts 
were well organized, volunteers met the need for blood.12" 
Drake found that Americans were strongly opposed to using 
paid donors, and overwhelmingly preferred to use volunteers. 1H 
When asked why they gave blood, American donors cited a gen-
eral awareness of the continuing need. 126 Drake concludes that 
"participation in the whole-blood supply is the natural, unforced 
response of a great many people once they are exposed to a mild 
degree of personal solicitation and some convenient donation 
opportunities. "127 
The intellectual problem is to explain why Americans, com-
mitted as they are to individual liberty, reject a market for 
whole blood and instead participate in massive numbers in a 
system of gifts. As a step towards such an explanation, we might 
120. A. DRAKE, S. FINKELSTEIN & H. SAPOLSKY, THE AMERICAN BLOOD SUPPLY 4 (1982). 
121. R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971). 
122. A. DRAKE, S. FINKELSTEIN & H. SAPOLSKY, supra note 120, at 3-4. 
123. Id. at 6. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 107-11. 
126. Id. at 97. 
127. Id. at 99. 
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remember lgnatieff's claim that we need solidar-
ity-community-along with liberty and justice. Perhaps we do 
feel "connected" in some way to the strangers in whose midst we 
conduct the daily round of life. One of the most powerful and 
certain sources of the connectedness is our shared embodiment, 
and the experience of illness and bodily neediness common to 
all. 
There are certain needs, having to do with health, that can be 
met only by one person sharing his or her body with another. 
Although this could be accomplished through markets, we have 
a strong, intelligible, and, I believe, defensible preference for 
meeting those needs through gifts: gifts of tissue such as blood 
or bone marrow; gifts of organs such as kidneys (from living or 
cadaver donors), livers, hearts, or lungs. We affirm our solidarity 
when we give of ourselves-literally-to fellows in need. We give 
out of generosity and because we need community; we need to 
affirm our connectedness in the face of the many forces in mass 
society that drive us apart. 
CONCLUSION 
The body, in its lifesaving and health-affirming manifesta-
tions, ought to remain "quasi property" in the eyes of the law. It 
should not be treated as ordinary commodity-property like 
VCR's or designer jeans. 
The body, in its significant manifestations, is not suitable for 
markets because our most important religious and secular tradi-
tions treat it as "dignity-property" or "sacra," as an integral 
part of the person who is the locus of moral concern and moral 
worth. It should not be traded in markets because markets in 
body parts, like all markets, will be subject to inequities and 
abuses. But these inequities and abuses will have special signifi-
cance in body markets, because it is the morally significant body 
(and health, and life) that is being traded off, and because 
wealth-sensitive markets in which the wealthy purchase life and 
health from the poor will be especially repugnant to our ideal of 
justice, which tolerates some, but by no means all inequalities. 
Lastly, we should reject body markets because our need to affirm 
community requires a realm of gifts by which we may minister 
to one another's needs. Gifts of the body, powerfully symbolic of 
our shared embodiment, are especially important. 
